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South Africa completely surrounds Lesotho, an enclave whose total population is estimated to be 
around 2.5 million. There is a long history of close interaction between the two countries. A survey 
taken in Lesotho in 2003 found that 37 percent of the people interviewed reported a family member 
working in South Africa, 26 percent reported a family member permanently settled there, 21 percent 
had sought medical care there, and 18 percent admitted to possessing South African identification 
documents. Further, the people of Lesotho are almost wholly Basotho, but the numbers of ethnic 
Basotho in South Africa are even higher.  
 
Not long ago, Lesotho had the distinction of having a higher proportion of its labor force temporarily 
employed outside its borders than any other country. For most of the 20th century, as much as half the 
adult male population worked on a temporary basis in South Africa, predominantly in the gold mines, 
but also in most other economic sectors. Until the tightening of border controls in mid-century, many 
Basotho also migrated permanently, albeit technically illegally, to South Africa. With the heightened 
opposition to South Africa's apartheid regime, and then the coming of majority rule in South Africa, 
Lesotho's migration patterns have changed substantially.  
 
Lesotho's migration has witnessed six main changes over the last 40 years or so:  
 
• First, as opposition to apartheid expanded, growing numbers of political refugees from South Africa 
entered Lesotho. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, these refugees formed a distinct exile community, 
especially in the capital city of Maseru. After South African military attacks on exile housing, the 
number of such exiles dwindled, and political refugees moved to safer locales further north or outside 
of Africa altogether. After 1994, almost all these exiles left Lesotho.  
 
• Second, the numbers of workers from Lesotho in the mines of South Africa first increased 
substantially, as real wages rose in the 1970s and 1980s and Lesotho became a preferred labor source. 
The numbers have since declined, dramatically in recent years, initially as a result of mechanization 
and relative stagnation in gold mining, and later partly because of a preference for South African labor.  
 
• Third, there has been a constant and debilitating brain drain from Lesotho to South Africa, and before 
that, to some extent, to Botswana and other African countries. This movement encompasses skilled 
workers, especially those in professional and technical fields.  
 
• Fourth, some former migrant workers became legal permanent residents of South Africa in the late 
1990s, following changes in South African law.  
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• Fifth, with continued relative economic stagnation and political upheavals in Lesotho, and the drying 
up of migration opportunities for the unskilled, growing numbers of clandestine migrants have 
attempted to find work in South Africa, especially in the less regulated parts of its economy such as 
farming and domestic service.  
 
• Sixth, a new group of economic migrants has come to Lesotho, the ethnic Chinese from East Asia, 
who now constitute the largest group of foreign residents ever to live in the country.  
 
Problems With Numbers  
 
Lesotho was one of the largest sources of Black labor in South African mining for well over a century. 
In the heyday of South African reliance on Basotho labor in the gold mines, to work in the mines for at 
least a year or two was a normal part of becoming an adult. From the late 1940s through the early 
1970s, normally any able-bodied male could obtain a contract as a novice to work on the mines. 
However, at that time, mine wages for Blacks were low, no higher in real terms in 1969 than before 
World War I, and not sufficient to maintain a family in Lesotho. So most migrants worked a few 
contracts to save enough money to pay bride price, and then "retired" to farming in Lesotho.  
 
Until very recently, Black miners were always regarded by both employers and the state in South 
Africa as temporary, oscillating, migrants. This, together with the restrictions on entry into South 
Africa from Lesotho (which were essentially non-existent until mid-century, but then became 
progressively tighter) means that all data on migration from Lesotho to South Africa are highly suspect. 
It is common to try to distinguish between two kinds of migrants, temporary and permanent. But the 
institutional arrangements in Southern Africa result in two complications: many migrants have strong 
motivations to hide their origin and/or intent, and many more may be regarded, because of the 
institutional arrangements, as being in one category when their actual intent and behavior is consistent 
with the other.  
 
Part of the problem is that there are at least as many ethnic Basotho who are South African citizens as 
there are Lesotho citizens, and there is a long history of cross-border movement in both directions. 
Thus, ambiguity about legal residence is not unusual. The survey response cited above - 18 percent of 
interviewees in Lesotho admitting to having South African identification documents - highlights the 
extent of such ambiguity.  
 
Two examples may help to make this point. Until recently, all miners were legally temporary migrants. 
But after the mid-1980s, when recruitment of new novices to the mines essentially ceased and total 
mine employment started falling, in practice miners from Lesotho had to behave as permanent migrants 
whether they intended to return home eventually or not. The reason was that if, following a period of 
home leave at the end of a contract, they did not return to their mine on or before their recall date, they 
would lose their job and never get it back. Further, those who had lived in South Africa for five years 
were permitted to vote in the 1994 election, and since then, those with long residence have been 
permitted to have their families join them and seek permanent residence in South Africa. At the same 
time, after 1994, significant numbers of professional Basotho obtained employment in South Africa, 
including in government service. The latter normally had to either claim South African citizenship on 
some basis, or have some other basis for legal residence (such as a spouse with legal residence). Many 
of these professionals and other high-skilled Basotho migrants privately express every intention of 
returning to Lesotho eventually, but in order to retain their employment in South Africa they have to 
categorize themselves as permanent migrants.  
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In all cases where there are clandestine flows, there are problems with measuring migration. However, 
in the Southern African context there are these added problems of genuine ambiguity of status, as well 
as frequent reasons to doubt that official classification as temporary or permanent corresponds to the 
individual's true intent. Thus, although many sources give precise numbers for different categories of 
migrants, except where the number is for a category with a clear definition (e.g., numbers of miners 
officially recruited), all such numbers should be treated with considerable caution.  
 
Migrant Labor and South African Mining  
 
South African sources suggest that total employment in mining peaked in 1987, at about 673,000. The 
total number of foreign African mineworkers had probably peaked 14 years earlier, at about 340,000 
(65.2 percent of the then total) in 1973. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, Lesotho was a preferred 
source of mineworkers, and the number of miners from Lesotho in South Africa (using Lesotho 
sources) probably peaked in 1990 at over 127,000. This was then well over half of the total foreign 
mine labor force of about 224,000. At that time, these miners outnumbered the ranks of people with 
formal wage-earning jobs in Lesotho, a situation that persisted until the late 1990s. Since 1990, the 
numbers of miners overall, and from Lesotho in particular, have fallen fairly rapidly. By 2002, total 
employment in South African mines was down to about 480,000. Now that the mines prefer South 
African workers, who can more easily be "stabilized," (shifted from contract to continuing 
employment, and out of hostels for migrants) these workers from Lesotho have been retrenched. By 
2003, the number from Lesotho in the mines was estimated to be fewer than 60,000.  
 
The consequences of the end of new legal migration to South African mines, and the retrenchment of 
migrants, have been devastating for Lesotho. They have been exacerbated by population growth, 
political instability, drought, continuing soil erosion, and the peculiarities of the country's limited 
economic development. The country, with an overall HIV-positive rate believed to be among the 
highest in the world, has the distinction of being the only place in Southern Africa in which more men 
than women are HIV positive. This is a result of the relative affluence of former miners when they had 
jobs, lived in single-sex hostels at the mines, and often had access to sex workers. Meanwhile, 
agricultural output has fallen by about 40 percent in the last 20 years, and few returned migrants have 
access to good agricultural land.  
 
In recent years, Lesotho has qualified under the United States' African Growth and Opportunities Act 
(AGOA), under which African countries that meet certain US criteria qualify for preferential access to 
the US market for certain goods, notably apparel. This has helped spur a rapid expansion of Lesotho's 
textile and garment industry. This industry was originally established to evade sanctions against South 
African exports during the apartheid era. The expansion has created tens of thousands of jobs, but 
almost exclusively employment for women; the garment factories do not employ men as shop-floor 
production workers. Rural poverty in Lesotho has re-emerged with a vengeance after the brief period of 
prosperity in the 1970s and 1980s that accompanied the rapid increase in the real wages of 
mineworkers in South Africa. It is now accompanied by recurrent hunger, as increasing proportions of 
rural residents are no longer able to grow food because of rising landlessness and inability to access 
working capital when remittances are no longer received.  
 
Brain Drain  
 
There is a long history of educated Black Africans moving back and forth between Lesotho and South 
Africa. During the apartheid era, many Black (and some White) South Africans chose employment in 
Lesotho over discrimination in South Africa. They made important contributions to health care,   4
education, and government and the professions in Lesotho. In the opposite direction, a number of 
individuals born in Lesotho rose to prominence in South Africa, perhaps the best-known being Potlako 
Leballo, who became leader of the Pan African Congress of South Africa. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
expatriates from the rest of Anglophone Africa joined the South African exiles in Lesotho. But already 
in the late 1970s, there were also movements from Lesotho to South Africa, initially to the Bantustans 
(the nominally independent Black homelands set up on an ethnic basis under apartheid) and then in the 
1990s to public and private employers throughout the South African economy. There are no reliable 
estimates of the numbers of people involved, but as a proportion of the stock of educated workers in 
Lesotho, and especially of the more talented ones, the movement is very significant. For example, it is 
known that over 100 medical doctors from Lesotho are now working in South Africa or further north, 
as a result of which the Lesotho government has had to recruit more than 50 foreign doctors.  
 
This brain drain is driven by the substantially higher remuneration available in South Africa, the better 
prospects for advancement, and the far better social and infrastructural environment. National income 
per person in South Africa is almost four times higher than in Lesotho, even by purchasing power 
parity estimates, and the actual monetary differential is even larger. As early as the 1970s, when mine 
wages started their upward movement, there were widespread stories of male teachers leaving schools 
in Lesotho to take jobs (usually on the surface) in South African mines, and numerous cases of 
university academics and government professionals leaving Lesotho for equivalent posts at two to three 
times the salary or more in Bantustans.  
 
Since 1994 or a little earlier, the floodgates have opened. This has taken place in part because of 
changes in South African law, but the situation has also been affected by changes in the social and 
political environment in South Africa that make foreign Blacks far more willing (as well as able) to live 
there. Many of Lesotho's skilled workers have found employment, one way or another, in South Africa. 
There remains a large salary differential between Lesotho and South Africa, resulting in Lesotho's 
continuing shortages of doctors, nurses, accountants, engineers, many kinds of skilled manual workers, 
and other professionals. Basotho with strong qualifications continue to seek better opportunities across 
the border, or in the case of medical personnel, even farther afield. In fact, Basotho nurses have been 
recruited to work in both the US and the UK.  
 
Illegal Migrants  
 
Until the 1950s, Black Africans from Lesotho (then Basutoland) were treated within South Africa just 
like South African Blacks. This was the case because in 1911, when the Union of South Africa was 
established, provision was made for the future incorporation of the three then "High Commission 
Territories," now Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, subject to the consent of their populations. As a 
result, the South African government tended to treat them similarly to its own "native reserves," and the 
British government tended to neglect their governance and development. It was not until some point in 
the 1950s that it finally became clear that Basutoland and the two other former High Commission 
Territories would not be incorporated into South Africa, and South Africa began imposing and 
progressively tightening border controls. However, the border is of the kind that can never be sealed. In 
the Western lowlands, it is a river that for much of the year can be walked through; much of the rest of 
it is in mountainous territory that would be impractical to fence effectively. So crossing the border and 
evading controls has always been possible. Furthermore, crossing at official control points is often 
possible without documents permitting residence or employment - Basotho have always visited South 
Africa to shop, seek medical treatment, or make social visits, and South Africans go in the other 
direction for similar reasons. Once in South Africa, a person from Lesotho can seek employment or 
self-employment in the large informal sector with relatively little fear of detection, and not much risk   5
of deportation if detected. And even if someone from Lesotho is deported, it is easy to return to South 
Africa.  
 
As a result, there is a long history of undocumented and unrecorded migration for economic and social 
reasons to South Africa from Lesotho, and there is no real way to know the numbers involved. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that in both the Free State and Gauteng provinces of South Africa, which 
have large ethnic Basotho populations of South African citizens, migrants from Lesotho are found 
throughout the economy, and include some prominent and successful entrepreneurs. In addition, many 
others have marginal occupations such as domestic service, hawking goods, and running various illegal 
activities. Although both sides have rejected politically unifying Lesotho with South Africa, it appears 
that in practice both governments have decided there is no point in trying to prevent these movements 
of people.  
 
In May 2004, the Lesotho minister of home affairs and public safety said that the two governments had 
completed a bilateral agreement on free movement, under which travelers will only have to show 
passports at the border. Further, there will be no requirement for a pass or passport stamp. Given the 
large income differentials between the two countries, and Lesotho's substantial disadvantages as a 
location for economic activity within Southern Africa, it is a safe prediction that over the coming 
decades a substantial portion of Lesotho's population will move to South Africa, at least for much of 
their working lives.  
 
Chinese Immigrants  
 
Historically, Lesotho has received very few foreign immigrants from outside Africa. Since the late 19th 
century, there have been a few families of South Asian descent in Lesotho as a result of migration from 
the South African province of Natal. Other non-indigenous groups have been confined to a few families 
of European ancestry who originally came as missionaries, traders, or colonial officials, and who chose 
to stay.  
 
The growing Chinese community appears to run counter to the past trend of extremely limited 
immigration from outside Africa. A few Chinese entered Lesotho soon after independence in 1966, 
when Lesotho recognized the government in Taiwan rather than the one in Beijing. A few private 
investments were made, and there was some aid from the Taiwanese government. However, the last 15 
years have seen a substantial change. Although Lesotho now recognizes Beijing, a local boom in textile 
and apparel manufacturing has been financed almost wholly by investors from Taiwan. These investors 
have brought in skilled workers and managers from mainland China. In one example, the large Nien 
Hsing Denim Mill is reported to have around 500 Chinese staff in addition to its 3,000 Basotho 
employees. In recent years, Chinese migrants have also moved into retail trade throughout the country, 
so that even in remote rural districts, many shops are run by Chinese. Chinese migrants have also 
established themselves in construction, with the result that Chinese firms are winning contracts for a 
majority of new buildings. Beijing's embassy in Lesotho now estimates that there are close to 5,000 
Chinese nationals in Lesotho from both Taiwan and the mainland, which makes it the largest foreign 
community ever to reside there.  
 
Challenges Ahead  
 
Before 1994, Lesotho's great advantage was that although it was inside South Africa, it was not part of 
that country. As such, its citizens benefited from employment opportunities and remittances, without 
directly facing the repression of the apartheid regime. Perhaps as important, the country received much   6
international aid and support, political and otherwise, as one of South Africa's "hostages;" benefited 
from tourism by South Africans wanting to escape apartheid's Puritanism; and received "sanctions-
busting" investment. Since 1994, from political, economic, and social points of view, that characteristic 
has become Lesotho's huge disadvantage. Because of Lesotho's lack of both natural and man-made 
resources, and its many disadvantages as a location for economic activity within the Southern African 
regional economy, in the context of relatively free movement of persons Lesotho will face severe 
problems maintaining public services. In order to do so, it will have to tolerate extreme inequality, 
substantial depopulation, or both. This is because to retain the services of the skilled, employers 
(including the public sector) will need to pay salaries to some extent commensurate with those 
available in South Africa. However, gainful activity for the unskilled can only generate substantially 
lower incomes than for comparable work in South Africa because of the other disadvantages of 
Lesotho's location.  
 
It is difficult to envisage a set of policies that could change Lesotho's status from what it now is: a 
relatively impoverished peripheral appendage to South Africa from which the more talented, skilled, 
industrious, or desperate will increasingly migrate to more prosperous places in South Africa. Lesotho's 
best hope is probably relatively rapid depopulation, until it eventually becomes South Africa's 
equivalent of the Scottish Highlands or Appalachia. Such areas, while not prosperous compared to the 
surrounding, larger economies, have still succeeded in greatly increasing average incomes. 
Unfortunately, Lesotho's political independence, and the vested interests that independence has created, 
probably make the chances of a smooth transition to such a relatively happy outcome less likely. 
Similarly, the efforts of foreign aid donors and international organizations to make conditions in 
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